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“This is a one-off opportunity for reform: to set Europe on a clear course for the 
future of Europe that as I have said before can be a superpower, if not a superstate.” Tony 
Blair (2002) 
 
The West European states have created a new security institution - the European 
Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
1 - with the end of the Cold War 
despite the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) existence and successful 
performance. They thereby decided to create an additional formal international institution to 
the one they are members of already – even though the membership, tasks and functions 
overlap significantly and despite the likelihood that the costs of creating a new institution are 
higher than adapting an already existing one (Wallander, 1999: 27 and 2000: 706). This is 
especially surprising since in the past the European effort to create an active defense and 
security institution, the West European Union (WEU), was unsuccessful (Cornish, 1996; 
Gordon, 1997; Schake/Bloch-Laine/Grant, 1999).
 Furthermore, when states invest in two very 
similar institutions where the membership overlap is not complete,
2 there is the possibility 
that the institutions will develop not in parallel – maybe even not complementary.  
This empirical puzzle is not readily explained by the traditional IR theories as the 
latter have focused on single international institutions and their relation to their member-states 
in isolation instead of looking at the interaction of member-states and several international 
institutions. Apparently, material as well as institutionalist approaches are based on the 
assumption that there is a well-functioning division of labor and/or hierarchy of relevance 
between the organizations in question, which are formally set up by their members.
3 
However, the tensions that have emerged between CFSP and NATO are telling another story.
4  
                                                 
1 This paper focuses mainly on the security dimension of this institution - that is, the S dimension of CFSP that 
became formally institutionalized in the ESDP.  
2 Since the Treaty of the European Union (TEU - also known as Maastricht Treaty) in 1992, 11 EU members are 
members of these two organizations. Out of 12 member states at the time. With the enlargement in 1994, three 
more neutral countries next to the already neutral Ireland entered the EU. Prior to the latest enlargements 11 
states were members of both EU [out of 15] and NATO [out of 19], today 19 states are member of the EU [25] 
and  NATO [26]. 
3 The Breton Woods institutions have been created all at once, preventing a functional overlap in the initial stage. 
However, these institutions evolved over time and there is not such a clear distinction anymore between say, the 
IMF and the World Bank. While the UN is responsible in maintaining peace and security worldwide, it can give 
  4The question this paper addresses is the following: How do two institutions with very 
similar tasks and functions interact with each other? As both institutions were not created 
simultaneously the question translates to: Why was CFSP/ESDP established even though 
NATO already dealt with the issues that fall under CFSP/ESDP’s mandate? Even though a 
European foreign and security institution had existed de jure since 1991 in the form of the 
EU’s CFSP, de facto its security branch only came into existence in 1999. This suggests that 
one cannot stop at the point of formal establishment to answer the question. Instead, it is 
important for the question to also look at the form these institutions take. The question implies 
an examination of the transatlantic relationship, especially an inquiry into whether Europe is 
distancing itself from the US, if it will challenge the US’s prestige and even power or if 
nothing fundamentally changed since the new institutional constellation. 
I argue that institution-building in the context of institutional coexistence and 
interdependence, that is, the process of institutionalizing European security policy, is captured 
by the interaction pattern of two variables: the ideologies of domestic parties in power and/or 
“old” institutionalized international norms within European states. The interactive mode 
between prescriptions and proscriptions inherent in party ideologies and international norms 
or between international norms can either be characterized as reinforcing each other, 
coexisting or contesting each other. Based on these interaction patterns, international 
institutional procedures as well as the national interest in institutions changes and one can 
observe a different institutionalization of the norms of multilateralism, use of force and 
collective security. Therefore, these patterns account for a period of institutional inertia and 
institutional dynamic by both NATO and CFSP/ESDP, which mark different stages in 
institution-building and parallel existence. As a result the substantive norm of collective 
security and the procedural norm of multilateralism are differently operationalized which will 
have repercussions on the transatlantic security relationship in the future. 
This paper challenges neoliberalism because CFSP was neither created with a clear 
mandate (read: purpose) nor was there a need to facilitate cooperation between those states 
who were already well organized in NATO. It challenges realism as CFSP has not been 
created based on relative power considerations according to which the European states wanted 
                                                                                                                                                          
mandates to regional organizations to fulfill this task. However, regional organizations occasionally take up the 
task without a UN mandate; see NATO’s Kosovo intervention. 
4 The fact that there is so much talk about competition despite the big membership overlap is interesting in itself. 
  5to balance against a clearly defined threat or power nor are they out to maximize their power 
in relation to the world’s hegemon, the US. It reveals limits of current constructivist 
approaches in showing that it is necessary to specify the relationship between social structures 
further.  
To elaborate on different arguments, this paper first presents different theoretical 
outlooks to the puzzle at hand. The empirical part of the paper is divided into three parts to 
illuminate and observe up close the institutional developments. The stages are not 
predetermined by any theory but are the breaking points of institutional invention and inertia. 
Although the paper deals with the development of the CFSP/ESDP and its relationship 
to NATO, it focuses on the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France and, to a certain degree, 
the US as the primary actors in this process.  
 
Explanations 
Realists see variables such as identity, norms and rules as well as institutions as not 
consequential to explaining state behavior. Instead, states are motivated to act upon power 
calculations. While traditional realist such as Waltz (1979) or Walt (1987) argue that alliances 
and institutions falter absent of the threat against which they were created, Schweller (2001) 
argues that the most powerful member of an international institution is the most decisive 
power in explaining how the institution develops. The military power of the US coupled with 
domestic incentives that give preference to US autonomy and selective engagement in global 
and especially European politics are signs of the US’s status as the regional and global 
hegemon. “Leaders have few if any domestic incentives to abandon policies of autonomy and 
unilateralism in favor of multilateralism and self-restraint.  The incentive structure of elites, 
even foreign policy ones, is primarily a function of domestic, not international, politics.” 
(Schweller, 2001: 174) According to Schweller, unilateralist policies have short-term political 
pay-offs and are more important to decision-makers than potential long term costs, which are 
too far off to be of political consequence (and are uncertain in any case). For this power, 
multilateral institutions are not binding, instead the “United States consistently violated the 
spirit of multilateral cooperation within its own alliance system” (Schweller, 2001: 178) and 
used NATO for “an air of multilateral legitimacy” (Schweller, 2001: 179). NATO is used by 
the US to reinforce US primacy. Regarding this line of reasoning, the Bush and Clinton 
  6administrations “strongly supported the continued existence of NATO as a way to prevent the 
formation of an independent European force that could potentially challenge U.S. global 
supremacy” (Schweller, 2001: 181). According to this understanding, the US should strongly 
discourage the creation of CFSP/ESDP or at least make sure that such an institution is not 
autonomous from NATO at any point. The Europeans, on the other hand, should have the 
intention to balance/challenge the US by creating an independent institution.
5 One indicator 
would be a steady investment in military capabilities to become less dependent on the US. 
One should expect a coordinated move among the Europeans based on shared power induced 
incentives.
6 
Neoliberal institutionalists see institutions as consequential to state behavior as they 
bound states to certain choices. Scholars that reason according to neoliberal institutionalism 
stress that the main motivations of states behind creating and sustaining institutions is their 
egoistic interest in efficiency maximization through the reduction of transaction costs 
whereby the instrumental utility of institutions is a facilitator of coordination and cooperation 
(Keohane, 1984: 80-83; Wallander, 2000: 708-711). An institution exists because of its 
material utility based on rational calculations made by the states to reduce or even eliminate 
the possibility of cheating through the provision of credible information and transparency. 
Information and transparency are general assets and their provision is a function of the 
institution. Over time, the institution guides and reinforces cooperation by reducing the 
transaction cost for each member. The main impact of an institution on its members is 
regulative as it enables and constrains certain behavioral patterns more than others. With 
regards to the above-mentioned puzzle, the sunk cost of NATO versus the costs of creating 
                                                 
5 Schweller’s analysis suggests that this development has to be understood as a reactive move from the side of 
the Europeans but he remains vague whether the EU is out to balance or to challenge the US (Schweller, 2001: 
183). As this is not crucial to the test at hand, both behaviors are a valid empirical finding to support the theory. 
6 Wohlforth offers another realist explanation of the current international system and the US-EU relationship. 
According to him, geography and distribution of power are the main variables that explain the stability and 
durability of the current unipolar system. States are the most important actors in the international system, 
alliances and institutions are not effective enough in “producing and deploying power internationally” 
(Wohlforth, 1999: 29). However, if European states translate their “aggregate economic potential into the 
concrete capabilities necessary to be a pole: a defense industry and power projection capabilities” (Wohlforth, 
1999: 30) the structure of international system will change. This is very unlikely as “regional balancing 
dynamics are likely to kick in against the local great power much more reliably than the global counterbalance 
works against the United States. […] This is why many Americans support an EU ‘security identity.’ If all goes 
well, Europe will become a more useful and outward-looking partner while posing virtually no chance of 
becoming a geopolitical competitor.” (Wohlforth, 1999: 31) If all goes well remains underspecified though. 
Furthermore, his assessment of Germany as the regional pole is questionable as in regards to power projection 
capabilities, France and the UK are far better equipped than Germany.  
  7CFSP/ESDP must be weighed against each other.
7 Relative costs and functional effectiveness 
of transactions, that is, the expected value of existing and potential institutions, is determined 
through the variable of asset specificity. Asset specificity is understood as the “degree to 
which an investment is ‘sunk’ in a particular relationship or for a particular purpose” 
(Wallander, 2000: 707). The more general the assets are, the more likely it is for the 
institution to adapt to a new environment. As cost calculation in regards to institutional 
functions dominate the analysis, Wallander predicts “when states will choose to maintain 
existing institutions as opposed to abandoning them entirely or creating new, more costly 
ones” (Wallander, 2000: 709). Hence, she pursues and “either-or” approach in regards to 
international institutional functional overlap.  
NATO could adapt, and hence persist, as its assets were general enough to be 
compatible with the new security environment’s requirements. A neoliberal approach a la 
Wallander suggests that an additional new institution in the realm of European security has to 
be created with the intention of a functional division of labor with NATO. Such an approach 
must demonstrate the usefulness of both institutions; as institutions are efficiency-maximizing 
devices, their interplay has to work accordingly. 
 
Domestic parties in power and institutionalized norms 
Conventional constructivism, with its focus on social interactions and ideational 
factors, offers another lens through which to look at the issue at hand.  “Constructivists insist 
on the primacy of intersubjective structures that give the material world meaning. These 
structures have different components that help in specifying the interests that motivate action: 
norms, identity, knowledge, and culture.” (Katzenstein/Keohane/Krasner, 1998: 679) Despite 
the work of authors such as Finnemore/Sikkink (1998), Risse/Ropp/Sikkink (1999), and 
Tannenwald (1999) that have shown how norms develop over time, and how they constitute 
and affect state behavior (e.g. domestic turmoil, domestic public opinion, world opinion are 
looked at as causal mechanisms), constructivists have to cope with critique from their own 
                                                 
7 “Yet if the marginal costs of maintaining an existing institution outweigh the considerable costs of creating an 
entirely new set of norms, rules and procedures, states will choose to sustain existing arrangements.” (Wallander, 
2000: 706) McCalla makes a very similar claim. “NATO members can thus be expected to turn first to exisiting 
mechanisms and procedures when confronted with new problems rather then creating new non-NATO 
institutions. The presumption is that actors will be disinclined to abandon sunk costs (political and economic) of 
existing institutional arrangements, turning instead to a mechanism (NATO) that already works.” (McCalla, 
1996: 464). 
  8ranks. The approach should concentrate on its “own puzzles that concentrate on issues of 
identity in world politics and the theorization of domestic politics and culture in IR theory” 
(Hopf, 1998: 172; see also Checkel, 1998). That is, domestic variables have to be included 
more into the explanations. Multiple social structures and practices exist at any given time and 
possible interaction patterns of different social practices and structures remain underspecified 
with regards to behavior. After all, norms do not float freely (Risse, 2000) but need carriers to 
be of any consequence and project durable expectations of behavior. 
One such carrier can be formalized international institutions. They are neither created 
nor do they exist in a social vacuum but instead are established on, next to and contesting to 
already existing domestic and international norms and institutions. That is, one can observe 
variation across members of an institution and across time. While work on the transatlantic 
security community recognizes domestic differences (Risse, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1995), the 
shared normative context (democratic norms in Risse’s case) seems to always trump at the 
end. While norms can be constitutive of identity
8 and interest, one needs to pay attention to 
the structures in which norms are redeemed and under what circumstances shared frames of 
reference and shared conceptions of interest are produced. Some existing norms and 
institutions facilitate while others interfere with the creation of new institutions. What makes 
the difference? It is the character of the interplay of two variables: domestic party ideologies 
and norms institutionalized within European countries and institutions.  
Domestic party ideologies are understood as the ideational foundation on behalf of 
which parties get elected and which informs their political will. The empirical referent in this 
case is the rhetoric of party officials in power, especially in regards to established or in-the-
making international institutions.
9 This understanding of the variable “party ideology” is 
taken as a proxy for the articulation of actor’s identity that constitutes interest. Here, the main 
focus will be on political parties in the UK, France, Germany and the US. In some states, all 
major political parties have adopted a very similar stance to certain issues in international 
affairs. In other states, parties have very divergent views in regards to issues such as 
international integration either because they did not have the opportunity to socialize with 
                                                 
8 Identity here “implies the notion of unity” and bears at least three features “the continuity of a subject over and 
beyond variations in time and its adaptations to the environment; the delimitation of this subject with respect to 
others; the ability to recognize and to be recognized” (Melucci 1995: 45). 
9 I use speeches rather than programs as the proxy since the party program is too generic for the purpose of this 
paper. 
  9these institutions (not in power) or because their ideological program is so firmly opposed to 
it. This variable presents domestic actors as carrier of social structures and makes this 
attribute of agency consequential in explaining institution building in the context of 
institutional coexistence. 
Institutionalized international norms are formulated informally or formally between 
governmental actors. They are not simply a function of power or interest but a product of 
social interaction. Stable norms are understood as “collective expectations about proper 
behavior for a given identity” (Jepperson/Wendt/Katzenstein, 1996: 54). However, not every 
norm is stable but can be in the making, ignored or deconstructed. At this point, the identity to 
which it refers is not given either but in the process of being (re)formulated. However, norms 
at any point can, nevertheless, stigmatize some behavior as unacceptable. A norm, understood 
more generally, is a “shared expectation about behavior, a standard of right or wrong. Norms 
are prescriptions are proscriptions for behavior.” (Tannenwald, 1999: 436) International 
norms are formulated in a bilateral or multilateral context and their content can be procedural 
or substantive. The former refers to norms that organize the interaction between actors and the 
latter is about the content these actors formulate their proper behavior around.   
The framework outlined here argues that international institutions, no matter how 
integrated they are, only have a partial causal weight in explaining, for example, the 
Europeanization of policy areas. As already mentioned, social structures either co-exist, 
reinforce or contest each other in the same social space/carrier.
10 The following holds for the 
relationship of domestic party ideologies and international norms as well as the relationship 
between two international institutions.  
Social practices and structures reinforce each other if the identities for which they 
recommend appropriate behavior are intertwined and both domestic party in power and/or the 
international identities (in the making) share the same understanding of the substantive and 
procedural norms in question.
11 The norm of multilateralism
12 and of human rights can for 
example reinforce each other. They are both part of the identity of a civilized state/actor. If 
                                                 
10 I do not argue that these three patterns are either comprehensive or definitive but they are a first cut. 
11 A major indicator of an unproblematic filtering and mediation of (newly established) norms is when all major 
political actors adhere to the same understanding of the norms and/or practices and perceive these norms as 
congruent with their own. Then one can call a norm and/or institution robust. 
12 Multilateralism is understood as “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on 
the basis of generalized principles of conduct.” (Ruggie, 1993: 11). One such generalized principle can be 
unanimity. 
  10actors are in a social space - e.g. one or two overlapping international institution - where 
consequential norms and ideologies are reinforcing each other, I expect institutional 
innovations to happen. The actors should be motivated enough to give their normative 
understandings enough venues of expression. 
Social structures and practices contest each other when they recommend different 
behavior for intertwined or overlapping identities. It depends on how internalized these 
identities are and how robust these norms are to determine what, if anything, will be done to 
resolve this tension. If the norm is robust and the identity internalized,
13 the tension will lead 
to a process in which norms can either be reevaluated and reformulated or loose on universal 
impact. In a formalized institutional context this happens mostly in form of treaty 
amendments, international governmental conferences and the inclusion or exclusion of (new) 
policy areas. An example would be the norms of sovereignty and human rights. Which norm 
will win over the other cannot be determined a priori but is an empirical question. It is 
important to note that the more established norm may not necessarily win or be considered 
more internationally legitimate than a norm in the making. The time frame of this paper is 
rather short (14 years) so that contestation of norms and different worldviews is unlikely to be 
resolved (through processes of socialization for example). Therefore, I expect actors who are 
in such a situation to behave such that an institutional development will be inhibited 
significantly.  
Coexistence of different social structures in the same social space is understood as the 
state where several proscriptions and prescriptions are independent of each other, that is, the 
behavior they consider appropriate do not conflict with each other. An example would be the 
nuclear taboo (Tannenwald, 1999) and humanitarian intervention (Finnemore, 1996). Here, I 
expect to observe institutional inertia. 
This analysis allows for a non-linear approach to institution-building where norms and 
practices are not simply adopted by actors with increased frequency and intensity of contact. 
The process of hardening of practices into robust norms with a robust identity occurs in 
different stages. The contestation to or reinforcement/coexistence of already established 
                                                 
13 As long as it is possible for one domestic political actor to come to power without having adapted its party 
ideology to the international practices and norms, one cannot say that they are guiding and robust over time. 
Bilateral relationships and the prior membership with other (successful) institutions informed different domestic 
actors’ preferences in regards to a European security policy differently. The member states’ actions, reactions 
and understanding of identity do not automatically become more “European” over time. 
  11norms and identities with new norms and practices characterize these stages and can explain 
how stable an institution is at a given moment. 
If this process leads to the establishment of two institutions with similar tasks and 
members, this social interaction patterns can help constitute and regulate (give meaning) their 
members in different ways as it creates and/or reinforces a shared understanding of the 
community’s purpose. Appropriateness can be understood differently in different institutional 
settings and the understanding of norms such as the use of force can be differently 
conceptualized and consequently differently prioritized (despite sharing of fundamental 
values like liberal democracy).  
 
Stage I: the creation of an institution and ambivalence among institutions 
Why a new institution? 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s, the West European states found themselves in a 
new security context. While NATO had prevented the nationalization of defense in Europe 
after WWII (even for France to a certain degree), the formulation of security strategies lost 
their degree of predictability. As these structural changes occurred, the Gulf War showed the 
Europeans how under-and mis-equipped they were for the security challenges that they would 
have to face in the future. But the Gulf War also showed the Europeans that the George H. 
Bush administration favors multilateral legitimacy as it waited for the UN approval before it 
entered Kuwait. However, while this new context and these experiences alone may have 
triggered the desire to change the institutional structure in which the European states 
interacted, these variables cannot account for why they chose to deepen the EC by creating a 
new institution instead of focusing on strengthening the already existing WEU or building a 
European pillar inside NATO. The latter two institutions already had assets and an 
organizational infrastructure at their disposal. All institutions could provide for a more 
independent political role of the European states, if so desired. 
The option of strengthening the WEU was taken up, especially by the UK, but none of 
the participating states could imagine such a move independent of NATO and/or the EU. “Of 
all the international organizations that exist today, the Western European Union (WEU) must 
be one of those whose length of existence is the most inversely proportional to the actual 
  12functions that it has fulfilled.” (Gordon, 1997: 125) That is, during its 40-year existence the 
WEU had neither established an independent identity nor an independent functioning of 
NATO and was not perceived as the right vehicle to express the overcoming of the Cold War 
(Cornish, 1996; Gordon, 1997).  
But NATO was very quick in starting to adapt to the new security environment. As 
early as in June 1990 at its London Summit, the change in the strategic environment triggered 
a process in which NATO’s purpose and practices were reevaluated and NATO’s “external 
identity” - its conception of its purpose in relation to other states and its substantive norms - 
reconsidered. This process did not regard the termination of NATO as a viable option 
(Ikenberry, 2001). A reevaluation of the threat and risk perception led to a process in which 
the NATO members reformulated the institution’s military identity towards a more political 
identity and broad understanding of security. The organization shifted its strategy from 
flexible response and forward defense towards a more diversified remit, “compromising a 
limited but militarily significant proportion, ground air and sea immediate and rapid reaction 
elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities …” (Strategic Concept 1991, par. 
47) at its Rome summit in November 1991.
14 NATO and its members had started a process in 
which it developed a collective defense system (Article 5 missions) with the aim of 
undertaking (selected) operations in support of collective security (non-Article 5 missions) 
(Yost, 1998: 1-2). This reevaluation led to NATO adding new norms, i.e. collective security 
tasks as part of its proper behavior (to its mandate). Tony Blair captured the dynamic well 
when he said the “real transatlantic community […and] shared values made NATO so willing 
to accept the challenge of adapting to a changing world.” (Blair, 2004) Based on this value 
community build on 40 years of learning from each other, the EC members knew of the US 
government’s continued interest and commitment to remaining involved in Europe (despite 
the Congress’s skepticism and the systemic changes) (Ikenberry, 2001: 215-56; Howorth, 
2000: 16; Suh draft: 363) as well as of the US’s skepticism of a European security structure 
outside of NATO (Cornish, 1996: 755; Wallander, 2000: 707, 723; Art, 1996).  
                                                 
14 Since April 1993, SHAPE has a working ACE Reaction Forces Planning Staff (www.nato.int). As part of the 
adaptation, the US decreased its military presence in Europe and most European governments started a 
restructuring of their military forces. The total of American troops in Western Europe has been reduced to about 
109 000 (down from 341 000 in 1989) (Yost, 1998: 340). US nuclear weapons, once numbering in the 
thousands, have been reduced to a few gravity bombs. The American presence remains through SACEUR, 
SHAPE, an integrated force structure, a joint command, a joint infrastructure and training and maneuvers. 
  13The EC NATO members, nonetheless, decided to create something outside of the 
framework in which they had pursued their military strategies for 40 years. Based on a 
Franco-German initiative, the EC members started negotiations on a political union in April 
1990 (prior to the Gulf War I) (Cornish, 1996: 756). The final conclusions were signed in 
December 1991 in Maastricht – almost simultaneously with the NATO Rome Summit in 1991 
(but not in coordination with it) - and created a single institutional framework for three 
different policy complexes: first, the EC, second, CFSP, and third, Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA).  
For the German Christian Democratic government, the main incentive behind this 
institution was to make the European integration irreversible. After all, it is the same party 
with which Adenauer had started Germany’s policy of “westintegration.”  
Das wichtigste Ergebnis von Maastricht ist, dass der Weg zur Europaeischen Union nunmehr 
unumkehrbar ist. […] dass ein Rueckfall in frueheres nationalstaaliches Denken nicht mehr 
moeglich ist. […] gehen wir einen entschiedenen Schritt ueber die bisherige Europaeische 
Politische Zusammenarbeit hinaus. […] Wir haben uns ferner auf die Herausbildung einer 




The French government under President Mitterrand, whose party had become a 
forceful defender of the European idea, also stressed the creation of an independent security 
identity as part of the EU; whereas the British government did not get tired of repeating that 
CFSP will not be in competition with NATO (Gordon, 1997: 128). The British Tory party 
traditionally has a transatlantic orientation and is socialized to a great degree in the context of 
the special relationship with the US or, as Chuter calls it, the “Anglo-Saxon operating system” 
(Chuter, 1997: 115). This relationship had created an understanding in the UK, especially for 
the Tories, that “European security would only be discussed in the presence of the United 
States, and only in a forum where that nation had the dominant voice” (Chuter, 1997: 115). 
The Maastricht Treaty nonetheless reads “security issues are fully included in the CFSP, 
including the ‘framing’ of a common defense policy” (Smith, 1996: 38). Consequently, the 
                                                 
15 “The most important result of Maastricht is that the way to the EU is now irreversible. […] a backlash into 
nation-state thinking is not possible anymore. […] we go a significant step further than the European Political 
Coordination. […] Furthermore, we assured each other to create an independent European Security and Defense 
Identity.” [Translation by SCH] 
  14British government was committing to more than it originally stated. However, the 
participating parties found a compromise in regards to the operational aspect of the new 
security institution. A declaration by the WEU members in an annex to the Maastricht Treaty 
states that their organization will function as “the defence component of the European Union 
and […] the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.” At the time, 
the German and French governments saw this as an opportunity through which Europe will be 
able to speak more visibly with one voice in the Alliance (Seiters, 1992: 39; see also Kohl, 
1992: 77). Chancellor Kohl and his party saw this more as an opportunity to set a symbol as 
they believed that NATO will remain the main defense and security institution in Europe and 
the European effort is only there to strengthen the Alliance in the new environment. On the 
other hand, as British Prime Minister Major will say two years later in front of a Dutch 
audience “we do not believe that it is either necessary or desirable to undertake a massive 
constitutional upheaval in 1996. It is true that the Treaty of Maastricht was maligned and 
misunderstood in both our countries.” (Major, 1994) This quote shows both the skepticism 
towards European deepening of his party as well as the carelessness with which the British 
government was sitting at the negotiating table. That is, a calculation of consequences was 
minimal at Maastricht but instead all parties acted upon their domestically grounded 
understanding of European integration. They went as far as their ideologies and the already 
institutionalized norms in the EC such as compromise finding, multilateralism and 
consultation would led them to act in their mutual space of appropriateness.  
To further elaborate on the motivations behind CFSP one has to look at what had been 
decided at Maastricht in more detail. The CFSP was not created in a social vacuum, though 
the (legal) institutional outfit under the umbrella of the EU is new. Member governments’ 
reluctance to communitarize this policy complex or even provide clear and precise language 
regarding CFSP’s scope in its legal text (Title V) shows that most governments saw no need 
other than a symbolic one to create this column.
16 The TEU negotiations involved no overt 
                                                 
16 The French government and its interpretation of the new security environment helped accelerate this 
development. The French government was worried about the new security environment in which Germany 
would be unified. This worry however did not translate into balancing behavior but, based on the well- 
institutionalized Franco-German relationship that dates back to the year 1963, the French government convinced 
the German government to work together with the European Commission in initiating a new European treaty 
which would allow for more integration and inclusion of economic, monetary and political fields (Howorth, 
2000; Ikenberry, 2001: 226). France might appear as the most strategic country in the CFSP endeavor but it also 
is informed by “simple” prestige motivations that do not fall neatly into any theoretical approach.  
  15bargaining, but instead searched for consensus. In the absence of a clear threat but the danger 
to anger the US and no further need of an institution that could facilitate the cooperation in the 
realm of security among European states, the negotiations did not produce an agreement on 
essential European interests. Material theories with their focus on self-interested actors who 
want to maximize their gains cannot explain this move. Instead, the participants preferred a 
general clause, which allowed the European Council to determine the scope of CFSP ad hoc 
(Articles D, J.3, and J.8) (Smith, 1998: 154). The Presidency directs CFSP (Article J.5 TEU), 
which left the member governments strong as they could hold up the transfer of greater 
responsibilities to the EU level. Furthermore, CFSP has strong intergovernmental traits 
without a compliance mechanism; this can be interpreted as cheating – one major concern in 
the neoliberal institutional logic - not being something to overcome in this institution-building 
process. The formal treaty allows for changes in the decision-making rules, that is, qualified 
majority voting (QMV) creates a possibility for joint actions. The Commission as well as the 
member governments have the right of initiative. Hence, the treaty provided the framework 
for procedural norms but little substance for policy.  
So why did the EC members create CFSP? The goal was not to project power. And 
neither did all members agree to create an institution that will have as its priority an 
encouragement of cooperation in the already institutionalized field of security. Material utility 
was not the driving force. The changing security environment facilitated the proposal of some 
EC members that, despite or maybe just because of NATO’s continued existence, the EC 
should take collective action to show the world and their domestic constituencies that Europe 
was adjusting to the new security environment with its own means. The prior cooperation and 
institutionalized norms inside NATO, EC, EPC
17 and WEU facilitated this move. That is, the 
prior institutionalization in and with especially NATO and the EC provided the EC members 
with a “luxury” asset: the possibility of experimentation. The different parties at the table 
shared a broad understanding of the “end of the Cold War” momentum and of the political 
need to establish a sign of political cooperation. But they had different conceptions of the 
                                                 
17 EPC was founded as an informal mechanism of co-ordination, independent from the EC in 1970. It was with 
the Single European Act that EPC was formally included in the treaty framework, and that the commitment of 
the member states to consult and co-operate in foreign policy became a legal obligation. “Like the SEA before it, 
the TEU’s provisions on the CFSP (Title V) are generally based on a set of existing practices established by 
informal custom. Its decision-making rules […] deliberately set is apart from those of the EC.” (Smith, 1996: 37) 
EPC harmonized the member states’ interest and “becomes more sensitive to the rules and objectives of the EC 
itself” (Smith, 1996: 44). 
  16form of this institution. Domestic reluctance in conjuncture with NATO’s continued role as 
the guarantor of European stability - for which end the US would remain committed to 
European security - shaped the form of the institution. To avoid the contestation of 
international and bilateral norms in a time of rapid political change, the EC members decided 
for a symbolic institution under a very socialized umbrella, the EU.  They trusted each other 
and were, therefore, more open to a trial and error period in which they would embed their 
security in multiple contexts without heavily investing in them. As social expectations are not 
likely to be very specific in the beginning of a new institution, rhetoric is enough to reconfirm 
to other members one’s own intentions. This leaves space for ambiguities, which can cover 
potential norm contestations. This made CFSP very flexible and, in the beginning, inefficient 
and ineffective. 
The political symbolism remained rather hollow in regards to a de facto institution, 
and no consequential institutional identity was established. That is, an institutional reality was 
brought to life based more on rhetoric than any action. However, the use of normative 
language that refers to the purpose of the new international institution entraps the speakers in 
their rhetoric (as opposed to Schimmelfennig, 2001: 72-73 where the use of norms is 
strategic). If the rhetoric has been formalized in a weak and vague international treaty, one 
can speak of an entrapment in which a vague legal foundation has the power to further 
encourage the development of an institution – but only in conjunction with congruent party 
ideologies. This entrapment does not necessarily hold for consecutive administrations, 
however. New governments are only partially bound to what has been said before. 
 
Ups and downs – who is responsible for European security? 
Political reality in the form of the wars in Bosnia and Rwanda showed the EU 
bureaucrats as well as those member governments in favor of a deeper CFSP that some 
governments were not ready for a common analysis and attempt to resolve conflicts together. 
Instead, what became obvious is that too many member governments were still on the 
defensive for different domestic/bilateral reasons (especially Denmark and the UK). The 
actors were preoccupied with what Smith calls “path dependency phobia” (Smith, 1996). 
Member governments were afraid that decisions regarding CFSP could persist over time, set 
legal precedents and limit future options (Krasner, 1989: 86-88). The actions taken were 
  17modest and “those that were achieved had to be haphazardly improvised as many of the 
details on the CFSP were unclear or unspecified by the TEU” (Smith, 1996: 41).
18 However, 
this steered once more the discourse on a more autonomous European security identity – just 
in what institutional setting could yet not be determined.   
As the years went on, scholars and politicians had to realize that NATO’s adaptation 
to the new political and security environment happened under constrained circumstances and 
according to NATO’s prior institutionalization and socialization process – the logic of 
appropriateness cannot be quickly reinvented. This adaptation process has not been occurring 
smoothly. NATO has been continuously facing the task of combining old routines with new 
ones, adapting assets and establishing a political discourse that gives it a reason of being in 
the eyes of its members and neighbors. While Wallander (2000) points out that the 
adaptability is based on the transferability of assets to new purposes, she fails to mention the 
political will behind such a move. No matter how transferable these assets are, the political 
will of the different member states is not a function of low or high cost only. “Cost and 
benefit are in the eyes of the beholder.” (Suh, draft: 408) Political will is based on party 
ideologies or in the US case rather on personal presidential platforms. In this regard, the 
Clinton administration had a much stronger understanding of multilateral foreign policy 
making
19 (which admittedly was not apparent in Clinton’s election campaign) than the George 
H. Bush administration and made a consideration of adaptability in such a format possible.
20 
With time, discussions and arguments about NATO’s “internal identity” – the 
relationship of its constituent parts to each other with special focus on procedural norms – 
came more to the forefront. The practices that have been triggered according to the normative 
understanding of multilateralism in NATO are based on an informally institutionalized 
asymmetrical interdependence. The US’s informal predominance remained (Yost, 1998; 
Hartz, 1955; Ikenberry, 2001) and was even strengthened after the inclusion of new US-
                                                 
18 Between the ratification of the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaty, CFSP produced around 26 common 
positions, 30 joint actions and 200 declarations. Almost half of those were related to the Balkans and especially 
Mostar. See Commission Report on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union (1996). 
19 “[T]he enlargement theme was in 1994 weaved into the national security strategy document […], the 
democratizing mission became one of the two main pillars of Clinton foreign policy.” (Suh, draft: 373) 
20 And NATO is still in the process of reinventing itself based on liberal identity (that is, a democratizing force 
for Eastern European countries; Gheciu, 2001) as well as on its role as security provider in the Balkans (Suh 
draft) and Afghanistan. 
  18friendly members into NATO in 1999.
21 In 1994, while the CFSP was as hollow as at its very 
beginning, European states started a discourse inside NATO with the US (Howorth, 2000: 
22). Their main aim was not to make the cooperation between the two institutions more 
efficient nor was it motivated by a threat that forced them to unite all their powers. Instead it 
was trying out another institutional venue next to the EU – and in a time of general NATO 
restructuring. The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was informally launched at 
the NATO Brussels summit in 1994 where the Petersberg Declaration
22 became part of 
NATO and eased some superficial transatlantic tensions. The NATO Berlin summit in 1996 
then officially launched the European pillar inside NATO and created its mechanism or 
military expression known as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) (Howorth, 2000: 22-24). 
The EU and CFSP found hardly any mention in this context but the WEU was the mechanism 
through which the EU countries could use CJTF. The WEU was now formally anchored in 
both institutions. While this innovation signals a “transformation from defense to security 
management [… and] is a clear break with NATO’s military stance as an alliance” 
(Keohane/Wallander, 1998: B7), it remains hollow and almost unused to this day (Robertson, 
2000: 29; see also McCalla 1996: 467).
23 Neoliberal institutionlist and constructivist analysis 
stops short by saying that CJTF shows that NATO was able to adapt without following up if, 
when and how this new asset is used (Wallander, 2000; Suh, draft
24). NATO’s “internal” 
collective identity is so sticky as to inhibit an inside alternative like ESDI. Instead, “NATO’s 
‘green light’ to ESDI unleashed a political process which eventually led to the St-Malo 
summit and on to Cologne, Helsinki and the CESDP.” (Howorth, 2000: 23). That is, the EU 
members of NATO were aware of this development. ESDI started a discussion about the role 
that CFSP, ESDI, WEU and NATO should play in regards to European security. Most EU 
                                                 
21 Despite the formal rule that all decisions are made by consensus in the North Atlantic Council - NATO’s main 
political decision-making body – the US has been able to influence the other members disproportionately with 
regards to its preferences and normative expectations. Arguably this made German unification and Germany’s 
continued membership in NATO a viable option (Ikenberry, 2001: 225). The everyday conduct of political work 
as well as the timing, style and tactics of operations are significantly influenced by the US (Yost, 1998), though 
the other members have an impact on the US and NATO actions more generally (Risse-Kappen, 1995). A focus 
on norms and US liberal ideological traditions (Hartz, 1955) helps to explain the form and character of this 
leadership. 
22 The same Petersberg tasks that are now part of the ESDP. The assets provided for it by the WEU are now part 
the EU. 
23 “ESDI is one of the issues where the level of transatlantic understanding is weakest.” (Robertson, 2000: 29)  
24 “NATO skillfully appropriated the European identity to strengthen its cohesion by underlining the democratic 
identity.” (Suh, draft: 378) 
  19members defended the creation of CFSP by using normative language, stressing that 
“whatever the inner strengths and common purposes of the Atlantic Alliance, the political and 
social norms and values which underpin the European Union are distinct and quite different” 
(Howorth, 2000: 87). Here, rhetoric was nurtured by the EU’s definition of appropriate 
decision-making and a less hegemonic structure. As the functions could potentially be the 
same, CFSP had to distinguish itself from NATO through a normative and identity-based 
discourse without the incentive to challenge NATO on a practical level. That is, while CFSP’s 
identity was not yet established, it took a harsher stance against NATO knowing that it 
depends on NATO when it comes to action and operational planning and execution in the 
field. The institutional realities were not contesting each other as CFSP was not missing any 
operational foundations. 
While NATO was trying to accommodate European demands inside its structures, the 
EU members met in another IGC to review the institutional set-up of the EU. Based on 
several bilateral initiatives by Germany and France as well as Finland and Sweden - national 
governments that, at the time, were pro-CFSP - CFSP was also on the schedule (Cornish, 
1996). This conference elaborated on the institutional design and procedural norms for CFSP. 
That is, institutional engineering and not capabilities were on the forefront. After years of co-
existence, the EU member states, while increasingly recognizing that the institutional design 
of CFSP needed revision, could not agree on substantive norms. The German government, for 
example, remained ambitious in regards to institutional engineering by determining issues of 
common interest, elaborating on QMV
25 and integrating the WEU into the EU (Kohl, 1996: 
167) but favored a role of “double-embeddedness” by saying that the institutional bite should 
come from ESDI (Kohl 1996, 165). Only then could the European states “mit einer Stimme 
sprechen und unsere Kraeft buendeln.”
26 (Kohl, 1996: 166)  
The major achievements of this treaty were to agree to establish the post of the High 
Representative of CFSP based on the 1996 Franco-German initiative, but the British and the 
French governments could not agree on who would occupy the position. Furthermore, it was 
decided that the Petersberg tasks will be adopted but that the WEU will remain outside the 
EU. At the same time the treaty explicitly recognized that NATO remained the cornerstone of 
                                                 
25 “Europa muss auf der internationalen Buehne effizienter, solidarischer und sichtbarar werden. Deshalb sind 
wir Deutsche fuer Mehrheitsentscheidungen […]” (Kinkel, 1996: 250) 
26 “to speak with one voice and to unite our forces.” [Translation SCH] 
  20European collective defense. At a debate at the Bundestag after the Amsterdam Council Kohl 
said “niemand von uns konnte glauben, dass in Amsterdam alle Probleme haetten geloest 
werden koennen. Niemand kann in einer solchen historischen Situation seine 
Idealvorstellungen durchsetzen.”
27 (Kohl, 1996b: 631-632) Cornish eloquently says “Even the 
most professionally prepared and aesthetically pleasing blueprint failed to eliminate the 
competition, simply because the clients had not really decided (or been compelled to decide) 
exactly what they wanted to build.” (Cornish, 1996: 752) That is, the institutional trial and 
error period – based on the luxury of embeddedness - was not over yet and the fact that the 
architects and clients were the same people did not ameliorate the problem. 
The Amsterdam treaty is another example where, without congruent party ideologies 
of the main EU members involved, the institution can exist but hardly operate on a 
substantive basis. CFSP remained an intergovernmental institution in a supranational context 
in which the EC effect was only binding to a degree through the involvement of the 
Commission and the value of socialization and trust building in the system with no 
compliance mechanism.
28 No serious reevaluation of the institution took place as several 
actors, and especially the British Tory party, were not willing to start the process of contesting 
norms. That is, the institutional design was still very dependent on the domestic norms and 
previously institutionalized relationships. Despite the claim that Europe is the most highly 
institutionalized region in the world, no institution, regardless of how many norms/practices 
and strategic incentives exist, develops automatically and in a strictly linear fashion. Rules, 
practices and trust do not automatically substitute for political will/preferences but must be 
further developed through the creation of substantive norms and institutional identity. 
Neither reinforcement nor contestation of social structures took place but the 
contributing parties took care that a weak institution could coexist next to the transatlantic 
security community by remaining very ambiguous. This weakness was initially reinforced by 
the structural fact that CFSP would not be an institution with a clear singular leader or 
hegemon. No EU member state has enough capacity or the will to pursue such a position. 
                                                 
27 “nobody could have hoped that all our problems would have been solved in Amsterdam. Nobody can achieve 
his/her ideal expectations in such a historical period.” [Translation SCH] 
28 CFSP had still little to do with security and defense, despite of the mine-clearing directive, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty renewal, the control of exports of dual use goods and the goal to prohibit blinding laser 
weapons (Smith 1998) as well as very modest joint EU/WEU action (one). CFSP was neither ready nor able to 
become more independent of NATO. 
  21However, this already points to different operationalization of the norm of multilateralism. In 
case CFSP would become operational one day, the decision-making process would be more 
symmetrical than in NATO. 
 
Stage II: Kosovo or waiting for Britain? Strengthening an institution’s mandate 
Domestic change 
While the Amsterdam Treaty introduced mostly procedural innovations to CFSP and 
tried to make the institution more operational, in 1997, “CFSP can hardly be considered a 
robust mechanism: It lacks a clearly defined objective, measurement criteria to achieve it, a 
timetable for institutional change, sanctions for defectors, and a central bureaucracy with a 
firm mandate for its operations” (Smith, 1998: 150). And the question of who will handle 
security issues was in theory still not resolved. 
Fall 1998 marked a turning point for the development of a consistent security 
component as an integral part of CFSP. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, by now in 
government for just over a year, launched a new European initiative which became obvious 
for the first time in the British Strategic Defense Review of July 1998 and a speech in 
Poertschach in October 1998.
29 This initiative was elaborated on at the Franco-British Summit 
in December 1998 in St Malo. Here, the EU “started off on the path towards becoming a 
military power” (Andreani/Bertram/Grant, 2001: 7). “UK and France had overlapping but 
different views about European capabilities. Over time however, both countries have shown 
their differences to be more differences of form rather than of substance.” (Hain, 2001) Both 
governments agreed that it was time to give CFSP more credibility. “We Europeans should 
not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard. 
[…] We [France and UK, SCH] decided that we should go beyond the Berlin arrangements 
agreed by NATO in 1996 to give Europe a genuine capacity to act.” (Blair, 1999b; see also 
Franco-British Summit, 1998). It was mainly a shift in British government’s understanding of 
a European foreign and security policy that made the summit and subsequent developments 
possible. The British government now thought differently about WEU-EU merger. “Some of 
our Partners have argued for some time for the wholesale merger of the Western European 
Union into the European Union. The United Kingdom resisted this proposal at Amsterdam. 
                                                 
29 The British government thereby “worked particularly closely with France and Germany” (Robertson, 1999b). 
  22While we do not rule it out today, we recognizes that is continues to present difficulties. Not 
all EU Member States share the same strategic perspectives.” (Robertson, 1998) It is 
interesting to note that the British Defense Minister and NATO Secretary General to be 
Robertson spends most of his speech at NATO’s 50’s birthday celebration on the EU instead 
of talking about NATO’s future. The language the British government applies to describing 
the EU-NATO relationship also changed. Duplication of institutional assets and functions 
became a viable option. NATO only has a role in new security tasks and, hence, will not be 
the cornerstone for this policy area.
30  
Most observers locate the sources of this shift at the international level and interstate 
experiences (Howorth, 2000; Andreani/Bertam/Grant, 2001: 12; Gnesotto, 1998: 124-25; 
Whitney, 1999: 4). They argue that the EU’s inability to act in Bosnia and Albania, the 
unsuccessful diplomatic dealings with Kosovo in early 1998 and the US’s reluctance to 
intervene in the European “periphery” frustrated the UK. While these factors played a role in 
British behavior towards CFSP, the timing of the UK’s shift leaves room for another 
explanation. The Bosnian crisis started in 1992 and NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, 
which served as an eye opener for Europeans in regards to the military capability gap between 
them and the US, only happened in spring 1999. That is, the material incentive structure had 
been the same for years in 1998. In May 1997, however, the British elected a new government 
to power – the (New) Labour party. Two weeks into the new administration, Prime Minister 
Blair signed the Amsterdam Treaty without having it negotiated much. Soon after, Blair 
started to search for a dialogue with his socialist/social-democratic counterparts in Germany 
and France, two pronounced proponents of an increased EU role in security matters (Blair, 
1998; Blair/Schroeder, 1999). While Tory governments are traditionally very Atlanticist, 
Labour is more ambivalent in this respect. That is not to say that Labour does not take the 
“special relationship” seriously.
31 But New Labour resembles the German position in this 
respect. It is sympathetic to the CFSP/ESDP project as well as NATO/US. 
                                                 
30 EU “bodies need to be the right size and shape to support sensible defence decision making. But they must not 
unnecessarily [SCH] duplicate the resources and functions that are available from NATO.” (Robertson, 1999 
also British-Italian Summit Declaration, 1999 and Franco-British Summit, 1998) and “NATO will remain the 
sole organization for the collective defence of its members. And it will also, as set out in the updated strategic 
concept published in Washington, have a role [SCH] in crisis management operations.” (Robertson, 1999) 
31 The special relationship exists despite different parties in government; the UK’s relations to ESDP, on the 
other hand, are still more sensitive to its ruling parties’ ideological grounding. 
  23The Franco-British summit provided the sign for all EU members that the time had 
come to discuss the issue of CFSP anew and this time with different incentives. In this view, 
the experience inside NATO in the spring of 1999 was an accelerator for ESDP, but it was not 
its cause. NATO’s late involvement in Kosovo was based on its incomplete adaptation to the 
new security environment and the lack of institutionalized common understanding of a new 
definition of threats and risks. EU members registered a divergence of threat perceptions as 
the US was very reluctant to answer the European’s call for help (Howorth, 2000: 23). The 
lessons learned fostered a common understanding among the Europeans that transatlantic 
security might be divisible after all and furthermore strengthened the perception that “the 
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO.”
32 Institutional collisions became more visible 
and at times dominated the political discourse. 
The Cologne Council of June 1999 transformed various bilateral initiatives (e.g. Saint 
Malo) into one EU process and decided on the future institutional framework. The Council 
meetings in Helsinki,
33 Feira, Nice and Laeken further elaborated on the issue (especially in 
regards to capabilities) and gave it more substance (Howorth, 2000; Andreani/Bertram/Grant, 
2001: 22-24). Necessary institutional arrangements in the form of permanent political and 
military committees, the winding down of the WEU and the transfer of most of its functions 
and assets to the EU (and not to NATO), the headline goal, and Javier Solana
34 as High 
Representative for the CFSP were agreed upon. Military expertise was internalized especially 
through the merger of WEU and EU. Along with military goals for crisis management, a 
range of civilian instruments such as police and service for post-conflict reconstruction were 
institutionalized. Concrete military and political commitments followed the institutional 
groundwork at the capability conference in November 2000.  
 
                                                 
32 http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/homeen.htm. 
33 Despite the fact that Wallander (2000) writes in 1999/2000, she does not mention the EU’s Headline Goal 
once. The willingness to endure high costs as well as the challenge to NATO’s asset specificity, complicate her 
functional argument in which states are efficiency-maximizing entities.  
34 Solana is one of many officials who would leave NATO for the EU. Actually, lots of junior officer were 
moving from NATO to the EU very recently which encouraged NATO to offer them a pay rise as an effort to 
keep them in the organization. However, one should not underestimate the broad array of topics the EU has to 
offer compared to NATO. 
  24Contestation of international institutions 
When the EU finally took it up to create a European security identity which was likely 
to overlap with NATO, the US government’s misgivings over European integration had 
become more pronounced. The French president Chirac even went so far as to say “the 
multipolar world France is seeking will provide balance and harmony. But it will not be 
feasible unless Europe is organised and able to play its role on the international stage.” 
(Chirac, 2000) And for the EU to become credible, it “means acquiring the military 
capabilities to be able to decide and act without relying on choices made elsewhere” (Chirac, 
2000). The American government “demanded that the EU should be obliged, even for an 
autonomous mission, to turn to NATO’s SHAPE […]. The Europeans resisted and ultimately 
persuaded the Americans to accept a provision whereby the EU could, if it wished, resort to 
SHAPE’s expertise […].” (Andreani/Bertram/Grant, 2001: 27) This shows that the EU 
members were able to reassure the US government of not having the intention to weaken 
NATO but at the same time they were not willing to shape their institution in accordance with 
NATO and the US. It also shows that while the CFSP responded more to NATO in the 
beginning it was now NATO that started responding to the CFSP. The US government, 
unenthusiastic to begin with as it saw its understanding of multilateralism in the realm of 
security contested, became more and more reluctant to give more than rhetorical support to an 
autonomous European military capability (Howorth, 2003: 16-17).
35 This became most 
evident with Madeleine Albright’s 3D speech (no decoupling, no discrimination, no 
duplication).  
NATO and the US still have one major asset: capabilities. The major sensitive spot of 
CFSP is the creation and pooling of capabilities together as to make the rapid reaction force 
credible. To address the shortfalls in national capabilities commitments, the EU launched the 
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). With the help of this mechanism the EU defense 
ministers declared in May 2003 that the EU “now has operational capability across the full 
range of Petersberg tasks […but this capability is still] limited and constrained” (quoted after 
Schmitt, 2004). Military reforms leading to the convergence on the types of armed forces 
(Schake/Bloch-Laine/Grant, 1999) and the concrete contributions pledged by defense 
                                                 
35 “Dangers to NATO and the transatlantic link are far more likely to come from European weakness than 
European strength.” (Albright/Cook, 2000) 
  25ministers show a growing level of common understanding in regards to the tasks, the purpose 
and the substance CFSP and ESDP should deal with – despite the US’s hesitations. Once 
these goals were agreed on, the work moved largely from the political stage to the 
bureaucratic one. Here, substantive and procedural norms of ESDP are established and 
reinforced through routinized practices. Everyday interactions establish communication 
channels in which mutual expectations become apparent. While NATO has narrowed for a 
long time the strategic horizons of European governments and weakened the European’s 
sense of responsibility, ESDP creates more autonomous capacities for the definition of 
European security problems and solutions. The Europeans insist more and more “on seeing 
the world from their own perspective and setting priorities instead of following 
Washington’s” (Whitney, 1999: 4). This, together with the Europeans’ insistence on a more 
holistic approach (military and civilian) to crisis management, accounts for the different 
interpretations of collective security. That is, collective security is differently conceptualized 
and operationalized in different institutional contexts; normative interpretation depends on the 
carrier.
36 
During the time of intensified institution-building inside the EU, the EU did not seek 
the contact with NATO but was not opposed to it either. The US and Canada though, as the 
main non-EU NATO members were very interested in what was going on inside the EU. The 
EU ambassadors were invited several times to NATO HQ but NATO failed to welcome the 
EU representatives with a commonly agreed position as the Turkish government has been 
vetoing the EU’s “assured access” to NATO planning assets as well as to permanent 
arrangements between the two organizations ever since the Washington Summit in 1999 
(Andreani/Bertram/Grant, 2001: 29). The French government reinforced the tense atmosphere 
through a pronounced reluctance to talk about anything of substance.
37 Hence, while norms 
                                                 
36 Different ways of addressing threats: regarding terrorism the EU advocated good governance instead of regime 
change (Haine, 2004) 
37 If one looks at the different press releases and communiqués that have been published at the (joint) meetings 
over the years certain expressions reappear: “will be mutually reinforcing” (NATO M-NAC-1(2000)52, par. 30), 
“avoid unnecessary duplication […] in the confidence that a stronger Europe means a stronger Alliance” (NATO 
M-NAC-D(99)156, par. 17), “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” (NATO M-NAC-1(2000)52, par. 
25). But NATO stressed ESDI instead of ESDP until 2000, while ESDP was already in full development. While 
at the outset, these statements suggest that both organizations are “perfectly” compatible, one has to keep in 
mind that these statements have been made in a period of almost ten years with no major rapprochement of either 
side and remain very vague to this day. Both organizations have done surprisingly little to coordinate their 
respective policies in many critical areas. 
  26and institutional structures were slowly emerging in the field of European security that had 
the potential to contest each other, this process was still restrained since both institutions had 
little contact of substance. Only after December 2002, when the Turkish government lifted its 
veto, was there the possibility to move beyond irregular and ad hoc meetings (NATO Press 
Release (2002) 142). However, the careful formulation of the press release that is based on a 
NAC decision of December 13, 2002, signals that the ESDP already evolved beyond a mere 
hollow institution.
38  
To categorize the NATO-EU relationship as simply collisional is one-sided, however, 
and overlooks the constitutive effects of institutional norms and values. NATO and the EU 
share broad common norms and values such as liberal democracy, rule of law and 
transparency (Gheciu, 2001: 101), which allow for a functional overlap and inefficiencies.
39 
No EU member wishes for the complete dissolution of NATO. However, to leave it there 
would assume that the ESDP is a subset of NATO. This is not the case. NATO and ESDP 
share some of the same tasks and the same broad values and norms but they have different 
institutional identities and dynamics, which shape the understanding and the interpretation of 
these norms – and construct different choice situations. EU members are not afraid to play the 
wrong game; they want to help shape the rules of the game. The EU is in the process of 
defining its own specific framework for external action. While ESDP hardly appears efficient 
in material terms (the EU faces considerable challenges in terms of overcoming budgetary, 
military and structural divergences to create a crisis response for autonomous operations), its 
efficiency is socially and politically constructed through the interaction of the institution and 
its members.
40 This points to a lack of efficiency or power considerations inside ESDP but a 
                                                 
38 “Welcome the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose purpose is to add to the range of 
instruments already at the European Union’s disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, 
including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged.” (NATO Press Release (2002) 142) 
39 The European Union Monitoring Mission in Macedonia is one example. This mission only became possible 
after the long awaited Berlin plus agreement in December 2002, which had been blocked for over two years by 
Turkey. This agreement between NATO and the EU allows the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, 
especially the headquarters, SHAPE. 
40 Something that cannot be left aside and which regards both organizations to a varying degree is the need for 
higher defense spending and closer interoperability. “[W]ithout military capabilities, without the political will of 
having military capabilities we may have committees, organisations for decision-making, whatever we want, and 
we will not have the reality to do things. And therefore the first thing we can do, […] is to really make an effort 
to construct military capabilities within the European Union. […] However, what type of capabilities and how to 
do it is the problem inside the EU and in NATO. […W]e have to put together things that belong to countries 
which are in nature very different, from the military point of view very different, we may have the same 
  27convergence of domestic political ideologies that underpin the political will of the EU 
members.  
 
Stage III: Bilateral relationships, hardening of practices and the formation of a Core 
Domestic change again 
Before the events of September 11, 2001, one could observe an increasing distance 
between the US and Europe not only over foreign and security policy issues but also over the 
norms and rules informing the transatlantic community. With George W. Bush’s move to the 
White House in early 2001, the ambivalent US attitude towards a more autonomous European 
rapid reaction force capability became more suspicious and critical. On the one hand, the new 
US administration did not see such a development in the interest of a strong liberal security 
community, but on the other hand it did not want to get involved in another Kosovo anymore 
either (Spiegel, 2003a, 2003b; Hoffmann, 2004: 14). The newly elected Bush administration 
made clear that the transatlantic relationship and engagements in “nation-building” have no 
priority for it (Howorth 2003, 25). Was there room for a division of labor? Not really, as to 
this point the EU still relied heavily on NATO assets and capabilities -- or better US’s assets 
and capabilities that had been earmarked for NATO and, hence, needed US consent to be 
operational in the field. The new coalition of neoconservative and conservative factions 
within the Republican party, however, made such a guarantee less likely (Prestowitz, 2003: 
277). The lens through which most European states perceived US military and political power 
had to be readjusted. “It is true that ESDP can capitalize on the greater awareness that 
international security overlaps with domestic security.” (Hain, 2001) While the German 
government had tried to balance between NATO and the EU during the previous years, just 
before 9/11 the German chancellor Schroeder mentioned  
But of course the transatlantic relationship of 2001 is no longer the transatlantic relationship of 
1949. The European side in particular is no longer composed of individual states, but has 
become a Union that is growing ever closer. Our cooperation must adopt to this new 
circumstance. We have to learn to treat differences of opinion and divergent interest 
responsible, should they arise. (Schroeder, 2001)  
                                                                                                                                                          
capabilities in trade proportional to our GDP, but not militarily, their traditions, their capabilities etc.” (Solana, 
2002) With the construction of a common defense market (the latest example is the Airbus 400M), major EU 
members have invested in such a project. ESPD gives them the opportunity to coordinate more among 
themselves. 
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With Bush in power and with a change in American foreign policy making, it became 
acceptable to talk about “differences of opinion and divergent interest” whereas before one 
was always careful to stress that all European efforts will “strengthening the European pillar 
of the Alliance” (Schroeder, 2004; Blair, 2004).  
Before the potential tensions could break out into open dispute, the events of 
September 11, 2001 changed the constitutive understanding of security, most fundamentally 
for the US. Initially after the attack, all transatlantic actors shared a broad common 
understanding of terrorism as a global threat and problem. However, soon into the war in 
Afghanistan it became clear that most Europeans and the Americans had a different 
understanding of how exactly the threat should be handled. Are military means enough or 
should a more holistic approach, which includes diplomatic/civilian tools be employed 
complementary to military action (Kissinger, 2003)? The governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic did not agree on this issue. This becomes very apparent in Europe’s reaction to the 
US’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) published in September 2002. The NSS 
formalized a unilateral foreign and security policy that the Bush administration started out 
with in the beginning of its term. Multilateral action is only envisioned à la carte. Here, 
NATO’s yearlong effort to build up a political identity is inhibited by the new US 
administration that makes NATO a more technical institution again. To argue that the new 
strategy is the result of value maximizing or purely power derived calculation misses the point 
that previous administrations did not commit to such a strategy despite the military capability 
gap or the inefficiencies inherent in NATO.  
[I]t is true that for us Europeans multilateralism is our life. […] to say that the mission 
determined the coalition is to do away with NATO and to do away with the transatlantic 
relationship or the transatlantic link I think is a tremendous mistake. […] For the time being I 
think that the coalition exists, therefore the coalition determines the mission and it may be that 
the whole coalition is not implicated in every mission, but in any case we have to believe that 
the coalition exists and that the coalition is a transatlantic link in security […], and if we don’t 
take that seriously we have to change the rules of the game. (Solana, 2002) 
 
What can explain the new strategy is the interesting coalition of ideologies in the 
administration in power. Neoconservative and conservative policy-makers have introduced a 
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points to a party in power whose ideological understanding of conducting foreign policy is 
contesting the procedural norm of multilateralism of the Alliance.  
But is also contests substantive norms as the NSS prioritizes military means and 
introduces a new strategy for dealing with a threat: pre-emptive war. The new strategy shows 
that the Bush administration does not share the same understanding of collective defense and 
security as well as the use of force as the Alliance. Pre-emptive strikes are not considered 
appropriate with most European political parties. The differences between most EU members’ 
interpretation of the new strategic situation after September 11, 2001 and that of the US have 
grown over time. Based on its new doctrine, and by sidelining NATO and the UN and 
violating the consultation and consensus norm inside NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1995),
41 the US 
intervened militarily in Iraq – together with the UK and a more or less symbolic “coalition of 
the willing”. This military intervention aggravated the rift on the transatlantic dimension and 
recreated tensions between the British government and most of its European counterparts.  
The CFSP/ESDP was not able to produce a common strategy. The British and to a 
lesser extent Spanish and Italian governments were on the US side despite their 
constituencies’ vehement disagreement with this policy. The UK’s siding with the US has to 
be understood as part of the “special relationship” these two countries have had since the end 
of WWII, which exists independently of NATO. This special relationship, while challenged 
several times, has never really been reevaluated in times of crisis since Churchill called it into 
being (Williams, 2003). It calls for a behavior that is not easily put in line with the expected 
EU behavior. The current British government, while it is supporting a European security 
initiative, only partly identifies with such an institution so far. While its party ideology does 
not conflict with the European project of creating a European security identity, its deeply 
embedded “special relationship” calls it to duty from time to time. That is, although the 
special relationship is a robust norm throughout British foreign policy making, its 
consequential weight is mostly situational – and after the Iraq war it is likely to be 
reevaluated. The Iraq war was such a situation in which the UK’s responsibilities with ESDP 
                                                 
41 The issue of Iraq was not brought up once in front of the NAC (interview with a former NATO official). 
During Kosovo every NATO member contributed to the mission, even if it was just a symbolic contribution as 
was the case with Iceland who send nurses. While Kosovo established an outlet for NATO’s political identity, 
Iraq is arguably the outlet to make NATO more technical again. 
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constitutive for British foreign and security policy in times of crises that involve the US, the 
British government decided to go along with it.  
 
Contestation and divergence 
However, if one compares these two pairs of tensions (US-‘EU minus UK’ and intra-
EU), one comes to the conclusion that they have different qualities. The ‘EU minus UK’-US 
tensions develop in the context of NATO’s increased marginalization. It is not a priority 
anymore to retain the general health of the relationship. The German president Herzog warned 
in 1997 that “Unilateralismus sollte es in einer Lerngemeinschaft ueberhaupt nicht geben.”
42 
(Herzog, 1997: 779) However, the Bush administration chose to favor unilateral moves. That 
does not mean that it is negating the transatlantic community but it is also not its priority in 
security matters anymore. Herzog went on in saying that values develop and change (Herzog, 
1997: 779). The new Bush administration triggered such a process. It remains to be seen if the 
transatlantic community undertakes the effort to learn from this or if the procedural and 
substantive norms are evolving in contesting directions in which case the members have to 
make a decision which to abide by. That would result in loosing opportunities for cooperation. 
The CFSP-NATO membership overlap is becoming less and less consequential in 
determining a collective foreign and security policy and instead the dyad develops into EU-
US tensions. The intra-European tensions, on the other hand, are being argued out in a new 
institutional setting, which has slowly developed mechanisms through which tensions can be 
overcome more quickly and easily. This becomes very clear when one compares the very 
reserved relationship between the American and French/German heads of state in 2002 and 
2003 and the British attitude towards the other EU members. The British government did not 
put a hold on dialogue with the EU once it decided to support the US in its war in Iraq, but 
tried to justify its decision. “For all the talk of international politics as the site of naked 
struggle, the pursuit of the self-interest, and the amoral exercise of power, states spend an 
inordinate amount of time justifying their behavior. Even when decisions plainly reflect the 
self interest of a state, they are presented within a language appropriate to the normative 
expectations of international and domestic publics.” (Lynch, 1999: 38) Blair could not meet 
                                                 
42 “There should be no unilateralism in a community of leaning.” [Translation SCH] 
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but soon after the war was officially over, the UK continued investing in and initiating ESDP 
projects.  
Europe’s role in the world is too weak. We have made a start on building a common voice for 
Europe. […] For Britain, there is a simple choice to be made. Are we full partners in Europe, 
at the centre of its decision-making, influencing and shaping its direction; or are we at the 
back of the file, following warily a path beaten by others? […] For 50 years, we have chosen 
to follow, first in joining; then in each new departure Europe has made. […] First, we must 
end the nonsense of "this far and no further". There are areas in which Europe should and will 
integrate more: […] in having a more effective defence and security policy. Britain should not 
be at the back of the file on such issues but at the front. […] The essence of unity, in my view, 
is to regard Europe as it grows in power, as a partner with the United States; not either its 
servant or its rival. [I]t requires the United States to take into account of Europe as well as 
Europe to take account of the United States. […] I am ambitious for European defence. I do 
not want to limit Europe's security ambitions to low level peacekeeping. […] Again we need 
more Europe, not less. (Blair, 2002) 
 
To the American audience/Congress Blair said: “And what America must do is show that this 
is a partnership built on persuasion, not command.” (Blair, 2003)  CFSP recovered relatively 
quickly from the crisis caused by the divergent opinions on the war in Iraq. In September 
2003, the British government asked for a summit meeting with France and Germany and 
agreed to establish a strategic and operational military planning structure inside ESDP and 
outside NATO (Spiegel, 2003a). The operationalization of CFSP’s understanding of 
collective security and the use of force was taken up again. This happened against the US 
administration’s wishes, as it basically establishes a headquarters (though the three heads of 
state agreed to not call it this with respect to the US) that can work independently of SHAPE. 
In November, the EU foreign ministers met in Naples for an informal session where these 
plans were further elaborated on. This brought sharp criticism from the US, especially the 
Pentagon (Spiegel, 2003b). After month-long discussions, the EU finally presented in 
December 2003 its Common Security Strategy paper. In it, the EU governments stress their 
understanding of the creation and maintenance of security as a comprehensive/holistic 
approach (Fischer, 2004; Schroeder, 2004). Already in 2000, Chirac pointed out that the 
  32“comprehensive approach […] is a considerable asset for the European Union” (Chirac, 
2000), that is, the EU can act from political decision-making over economic and humanitarian 
measures to military deployment. When talking about the Common Strategy, German Foreign 
Minister Fischer said that “Europe is growing closer together. I am absolutely certain about 
that” (Fischer, 2004). He continues by saying that Europe and US should “work together 
strategically as partners” (Fischer, 2004). A shared base of values is less and less mentioned 
when referring to the transatlantic relationship and instead the term “strategic partnership” 
starts dominating the discourse.
43  
France, Germany, and the UK met in London in January 2004 to boost the trilateral 
relationship. The three governments “are developing a coordinated approach to a variety of 
international issues” (Blitz/Adams/Graham, 2004: 3). Furthermore, all three states 
pronounced their interest in more frequent trilateral meetings. These are indications that a 
security core is developing inside the EU to establish a more coordinated and coherent 
mechanism that is becoming increasingly robust and well-equipped in material terms. The 
Iraqi crisis has produced a common awareness and understanding among EU governments of 
the need for a common strategic thinking and the further development of a capacity for 
common strategic reasoning. Hence, ESDP has increasingly developed the capacity to absorb 
internal division and instead build a coherent institutional identity with its own procedural and 
substantive norms.  
The EU - and especially ESDP – has made “at least three major breakthroughs” 
(Haine, 2004) since the war in Iraq: a common Action Plan to fight against the proliferation of 
WMD, the framing of a common strategic concept and the military involvement outside of 
Europe in a peacekeeping intervention in Congo. With the capability goal almost entirely met 
and new willingness in Europe to intervene militarily, the practical division of the 
Americans/NATO fighting and the Europeans cleaning up afterwards which existed mostly 
due to the capability gap might not be as clear in the future. Throughout the last decade, the 
US and NATO mostly intervened militarily in places after the Europeans asked the 
organization to do so. From now on, the EU will be increasingly capable of circumventing 
                                                 
43 Despite Straw’s more careful formulation, he also did not mention the value community in his speech. “But 
ESDP is emphatically not NATO’s replacement. However effective Europe becomes as a regional or global 
actor, we cannot expect to make a real difference without regular, close and systematic co-operation with the US 
in NATO, and higher and more focused defense spending. This is essential if we in Europe are serious about 
wanting to play a leading role in international affairs.” (Straw, 2002) 
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divergences of priorities that are not simply of geographical or geopolitical nature but go into 
the discussion of what constitutes a threat and how it should be handled. The EU does not 
prefer a holistic approach because it is weak, but because it thinks that such an approach is 
superior to purely military means. And it conceptualized its norms accordingly. This approach 
is nurtured by the lack of power politics tradition in post-World War II Europe.
44 While we 
can observe outcomes that at some times fit a neoliberal or a power-based explanation, the 
process of ESDP’s institution-building as a whole cannot be captured by either.  
 
Conclusion 
‘But why’, a skeptical observer might ask, ‘was the initiative taken in the European Union in 
the first place?’ [… S]ecurity in the 21
st century is multidimensional. It demands a multi-
dimensional response both in the range of institutions we call on to provide our security, and 
within each of those institutions. The European Union is a significant actor on the world stage 
and it can only make sense to capitalize on the additional political will and momentum that the 
European Union can generate. (Hoon, 2000)  
 
It will happen in starts and stops, but I am convinced that it is necessary and inevitable. 
(Chirac, 2000) 
 
States do not become members of international institutions every day since the 
creation and maintenance of institutions is expensive. However, the last one-and-a-half-
decades witnessed institutional innovations in the field of security in Europe. As the 
preceding discussion showed, the NATO-EU relationship is very complex and needs to be 
understood to explain CFSP’s institution-building process as well as transatlantic security 
policies. The overlap in membership and functions implies uncertainty about the division of 
tasks and assets as well as the compatibility in identity. Their “justification of existence” as 
well as their relationship to each other cannot be captured well with neoliberal institutionalist 
or power-based approaches. The main motivation behind the CFSP is neither purely strategic, 
functional, altruistic nor pursuant of adaptational pressures. That is, neither the fear that the 
US would withdraw from Europe, necessitating a European security institution, nor a general 
                                                 
44 Since WWII Europe has been a junior partner in security affairs and not a protagonist. 
  34dislike of US supremacy motivated this political decision. Nor was there a major threat or risk 
recognized by all member states as such and against which they wanted to organize. The 
absence of net economic and security benefits make the political phenomenon at hand an 
“exception.”  
As British Defense Minister Hoon said political will and momentum are the reasons 
why the European states were willing to create two institutions next to each other. In this 
paper, political will is understood as party ideologies in regards to foreign and security policy 
and the momentum is understood as internationally institutionalized norms. The interaction 
patterns of these two variables account for CFSP’s existence – which includes its relationship 
to NATO, its form and its nonlinear development. It is, after all, not a coincidence that in the 
prior analysis the institutional stages coincide with domestic changes. The institution-building 
process is not straightforward and still partly depends on the political will of member 
governments. So far the institutional performance has varied in robustness and coherence 
because of patterns of norm contestation, reinforcement and coexistence. In the beginning of 
CFSP’s existence, the institution was less than a cooperation facilitator but then changed over 
time. A distinct European security identity is emerging. It was neither a perception of crisis 
nor structural changes that caused the formation of this identity, that is, the dialogue 
surrounding that identity evolved with little strategic framing. 
What that means for the NATO-CFSP relationship is that as long as CFSP remained 
more a political symbol than a political and military reality, it could coexist with NATO 
without major tensions. This process implies that in very sensitive issue areas, norms of 
procedure are more easily agreed upon and implemented than crucial substantive norms. With 
increasing elaboration of substantive norms, the definition of ESDP’s and NATO’s/US 
security milieus are diverging more and more. With the accomplishment of the EU Headline 
Goal and the current US administration different understandings of the use of force, collective 
defense and security as well as multilateralism one can note a fine recalibration of the 
transatlantic relationship. The institutions do not necessarily carry and interpret norms the 
same way. Multilateralism can carry many different faces. These differences have important 
repercussions for their definition and handling of threats and risks. Domestic party beliefs as 
well as international substantive and procedural norms have a decisive influence on policy 
outcomes.  
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